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The Independence of Judges: The Uses and
Limitations of Public Choice Theory
Richard A. Epstein*
I. INTRODUCTION: A MEAGER HARVEST
How do judges behave in deciding cases? The question
seems to be peculiarly immune to the ordinary techniques of so-
cial science analysis. While public choice theory in particular has
achieved important breakthroughs in understanding legislative
behavior, it has not achieved similar successes in dealing with
judicial behavior. Yet, in an odd sense, its inability to provide us
with strong predictions as to how judges behave should be re-
garded as a backhand confirmation of the theory, and not as its
refutation. Given the set of institutional constraints under which
judges routinely labor, the basic assumption of public choice
theory-that self interest rules behavior in public as well as pri-
vate transactions-should yield only weak and instructive gener-
alizations about judicial behavior. The fundamental soundness
of our constitutional structure has channeled self-interest away
from its most destructive paths, and has robbed it of its greatest
possibilities of doing political and constitutional mischief.
To develop these themes, this paper will proceed in several
steps. Section II takes a short detour into the standard modes of
self-interest analysis that social scientists (and to some extent
lawyers) bring to these issues. It then explains why public choice
analysis, as applied to judicial behavior, necessarily yields a very
meager harvest. Section III deals with "judicial temptation" and
its institutional constraints. These constraints are so effective
that, even when judges do act to maximize their own individual
self-interest, by default they are influenced by the matters of
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chi-
cago. This paper was prepared for a Conference on Public Choice and the Judiciary,
sponsored by the Institute of Political Economy, Utah State University. I also presented
an earlier version at a faculty workshop at Washington & Lee University Law School in
October, 1989. I have profited from comments by Jonathan Macey and Richard Posner
on an earlier draft of this paper, and I should like to thank Gerhard Casper for his
advice on many of the issues raised in this paper.
HeinOnline  -- 1990 BYU L. Rev. 827 1990
828 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1990
background and temperament that receive so much weight in
the ordinary political science accounts of judicial behavior. Fi-
nally, section IV turns to the related issue of judicial "virtue":
does the independence of the judiciary, once secured, advance or
impede long term social welfare? Here I conclude that it is a
mistake to assume, as has been argued by Professor Landes and
Judge Posner,' that judges function as the legal glue that holds
in place the deals generated by interest-group politics. By the
same token, however, judicial independence offers no guarantee
that judicial decisions will serve the public interest, even if we
could all agree as to how it should be defined.
II. Is SELF-INTEREST UNIVERSAL?
There is today a single dominant social science paradigm for
the analysis of individual and group behavior-one that argues
that individuals in all their roles act to maximize their individ-
ual self-interest under conditions of uncertainty. Within this
framework there are no independent moral constraints upon be-
havior. The theory as stated is totally remorseless in its scope
and regards any deviation from the central thesis as unwar-
ranted sentimentality or as an ad hoc retreat from the rigors of
academic discipline.
This hard line carries with it certain distinct methodological
and intellectual attractions. If individuals do not maximize indi-
vidual self-interest, then just precisely what do they do? Do we,
for example, boldly proclaim that self-interest is irrelevant to in-
dividual motivation? If so, political actors, for example, could be
posited to act solely in pursuit of the common or collective good,
as social welfare theorists define it. But empirically the extreme
position of universal, disinterested benevolence seems wrong.
There are too many instances of greed in government and else-
where, of which the widespread misappropriation in HUD pro-
grams and grants is only one conspicuous recent example.3 Self-
interest may not be the whole truth but it is a large part of the
truth nonetheless-too big for any theory to ignore.
Any assumption of universal benevolence, moreover, gener-
1. See generally Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
2. E.g., Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in RATONAL CHOICE
108 (J. Elster ed. 1986).
3. See, e.g., Pound, House Panel Urges Broader HUD Inquiry, Wall St. J., Jul. 25,
1990, at 14, col. 4.
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ates harmful prescriptions for good government. The complex
structures of government-the separation of powers, the system
of checks and balances, and the arduous procedures required
under the name of due process-all rest on the skeptical as-
sumption that individuals vested with public power are both
able and willing to turn that power wrongly to private ends.4
Any constitutional assumption that fashions institutions in the
belief that individuals generally behave in accordance with the
maxim, "from each according to his ability, to each according to
his need," renders these complex constitutional provisions re-
dundant and useless. Why erect elaborate safeguards against
risks that will never come to pass? Worse still, if these safe-
guards are discarded, then the rate of return to bad actors from
taking positions of public power will increase. The wrong social
incentives will therefore tend to propel the most corrupt and ve-
nial individuals into positions of public power and responsibility.
The public choice perspective thus offers an important moral
and cautionary dimension.
If, therefore, we are to abandon the remorseless vision of
individual self-interest, then we must adopt some "mixed" vi-
sion of the determinants of individual behavior: Per-
sons-sometimes, usually, virtually always-act to maximize
their self-interest but-often, occasionally, rarely-deviate from
that principle. From a sense of duty and honor, persons may dis-
charge their prior obligations or sacrifice themselves to advance
some more altruistic end, but they may also fail to do so. These
mixed solutions carry the appearance of sweet reason, but they
raise serious conceptual difficulties as well. The first of these
specifies the proportions in the mix. Do we assume that self-
interest dominates 55% of the time, or 99.99% of the time, and
why? For the political theorist concerned with the structure of
political institutions, that question is important but not all con-
suming. So long as self-interest is regarded as a persistent but
not universal danger, there will still be a strong need to take
4. Similar assumptions exist, moreover, for private voluntary organizations, be they
churches, corporations, clubs or condominiums. In each case there is commonly a divi-
sion of power between a supervisory board and a single individual with executive power.
Private individuals can also convert other people's private wealth to their own personal
gain. See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 JL. & ECON.
301 (1983) (examining the problem of optimal firm structure for public corporations,
professional partnerships and nonprofit organizations).
For the parallels between private organizations and constitutional structure, see Ep-
stein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CoaNzLL L. REV. 906 (1988).
827]
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structural precautions against it. The precise level of the precau-
tion depends upon the frequency and severity of improper con-
duct, as well as the costs of reducing that conduct. In matters
such as these, rough estimates are the best that can be expected.
Thus even if the self-interest hypothesis is not universally true,
then there is still good reason for acting as though it were in
order to justify the constitutional safeguards on government
actors.
The academic theorist, however, cannot take refuge in those
probabilistic verities. The postulate that all individuals maxi-
mize their self-interest will only ground a comprehensive theory
if it rises to the level of a universal truth. It must account for all
instances of individual behavior, which by common experience
runs from egregious to benevolent. From the standpoint of Dar-
winian biology, a single act of generosity in nature is a refutation
to the theory of natural selection,5 and social scientists who take
the remorseless view of self-interest have to take much the same
view of human behavior.' They have to supply ready explana-
tions for the difficult cases (like judges) as well as the easy ones
(like most legislators). Sometimes it might be possible to dismiss
a benevolent action as a mistaken aberration, unlikely to be re-
peated. Sometimes a network of indirect or reputational benefits
generates self-interested explanations for what appears to be be-
nevolent behavior. And sometimes people may have interdepen-
dent utility functions which explain why happiness to children is
a benefit to parents and vice versa.
The hard theoretical question is whether these qualifica-
tions, taken together, amount to an important enrichment of the
theory of individual self-interest or to its transformation, sub
silentio, into an unfalsifiable tautology. I suspect that the theory
survives its qualifications. Such is in accord with most of our
considered intuitions about self-interest, captured in David
Hume's wonderful phrase, "selfishness and confin'd generosity. ' '7
But taking this sober middle position comes at a price. It risks a
total retreat from analytical rigor, for whenever the evidence is
difficult to square with the self-interest hypothesis we can in-
5. R. DAWmINS, THE SELFISH GENE 4, 38 (1978).
6. See generally Becker, supra note 2.
7. "Here then is a proposition, which, I think, may be regarded as certain, that 'tis
only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity of men, along with the scanty provi-
sion nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin." D. HumE, A TREA-
TISE ON HUMAN NATURE 495 (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1960).
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yoke its benevolence exception until the overall theory is robbed
of all explanatory power.
So there is a hard initial choice. The richer theory with its
qualifications may fall prey to ad hoc explanations, while the
more powerful, unqualified theory single mindedly may miss im-
portant features of the overall situation. Within the context of
the self-interest debate, judicial behavior presents a special chal-
lenge. If the theory of individual self-interest that grounds pub-
lic choice is as strong as its proponents claim, then it should
supply insights into the behavior of all classes of public officials.
Yet it is quite clear that the major strides in this area are made
largely with legislative and political actors who are the subject of
most public choice analysis.8 The judiciary is generally left off to
one side because judges are typically thought, by conscious con-
stitutional design, to lie in some qualified space outside the po-
litical process, immune from the temptations that pervade the
legislative and executive branches of government.'
There is much truth to the common observation that self-
interest theory reaches its low ebb with judges. But that conclu-
sion need not refute public choice theory, even in its most pris-
tine form. Judges may well act only out of self-interest, but the
system is so organized that they do not face the pressures and
temptations necessarily encountered by other political actors.
The structure of the "independent" judiciary is designed to re-
8. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 T x L. REV.
873 (1987); McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in The Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971); Weingast.& Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON.
765, 771 (1983) ("[e]ach representative chooses actions (voting, introducing new legisla-
tion) so as to maximize his political support function generated by the interests within
his district").
For what it is worth, two comprehensive introductions to public choice theory, I.
McLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICEa AN INTRODUCTION (1987) and D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE
(1979), do not refer to the behavior of judges.
9. See, e.g., H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958); see also Farber & Frickey, supra note
8, at 908-11 (Discussion of the judiciary is largely confined to the question of whether
courts can distinguish sufficiently between public interest and special interest legislation
to intervene usefully in the process. Their skeptical conclusion leads them to take the
view that judicial restraint is the appropriate response to factional politis.). I have taken
a different view. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAUNGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U.
Cm. L. REV. 703 (1984). In both cases I treat all conscious deviations from competitive
markets as a form of special interest legislation, a baseline that Professors Farber and
Frickey do not examine.
827]
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move judges from the day-to-day pressures and temptations of
ordinary political office, and with some qualifications it achieves
that end. It is a strategy that recognizes the forces of self-inter-
est, regards them as potentially destructive, and then takes suc-
cessful institutional steps to counteract certain known and obvi-
ous risks. Independence is of course not an absolute-Congress
has power over judicial salaries and the judicial budget 1°-but
independence remains a dominant constitutional theme. The
bounded success of our overall constitutional design has allowed
the judicial branch to escape the criticism and scrutiny that has
been heaped on the overtly political branches of government.
But the strategy, like all management strategies, is not a cure for
all institutional risks. It only minimizes certain risks ex ante, but
it does not create an error-proof environment where all decisions
are necessarily made correctly. There are both costs and benefits
of independence, and a candid assessment of our present system
of judicial independence requires both to be taken into account
at the same time.
III. MOTIVATIONS AND TEMPTATIONS OF JUDGES
What would a self-interested judge do to maximize his or
her individual returns from public office? In answering this
question, it is helpful to distinguish between two ordinary judi-
cial roles. The first, and more conventional role, concerns their
activities in hearing arguments, deciding cases and writing opin-
ions. The second concerns their other judicial functions, which
may involve judicial administration, hiring clerks, appearing
before Congress, and participating in professional organizations
and conferences. In general, the sensitive portion of the judicial
role concerns the first class of duties, and it is to those duties
that the issue of judicial independence is directed. As to the sec-
ond class of judicial functions, judges are not subject to any ex-
ceptional constraints, except those needed to buttress the rela-
tive isolation needed for their first role. Otherwise they are
constrained, for better or for worse, by the same forces that nor-
mally control market actors. The distinction between these two
classes of judicial activities offers a chance to test the relative
strength of institutions and character in determining individual
behavior. On this point the public choice theory presupposes
10. Concerning the judicial budget see Toma, Congressional Influence and the Su-
preme Court: The Budget as a Signaling Device, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1991).
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that judges act out of self-interest in both roles, and hence maxi-
mize utility, subject only to the different external norms. Where
these norms bite, judges bend. Where they do not, judges behave
like other individuals. The non-public choice view places far
greater stress upon character. Under this view, taking on the
role of a judge invests individuals with a sense of place and posi-
tion. Judges have a superior fitness for office that keeps them
from reverting to the usual self-interested behavior when the
sanctions upon them are relaxed. In general, I think that the
more cautious view of human nature offers superior predictions
of how judges will behave when their conduct is not regulated by
the elaborate set of institutional constraints now in place. The
available anecdotal evidence suggests that judges will behave
more or less like the rest of us when their conduct is not closely
constrained.
A. Judging Cases
1. Incentive structures
Judging cases lies at the heart of the judicial function.
Therefore, we should expect judges who misbehave in this criti-
cal role to face powerful sanctions. Judges may not talk about
pending business with any outsider;11 nor reveal privately the
decision in any case prior to its disclosure to the immediate par-
ties and the public;12 nor allow connection or money to (even
appear to) influence the outcome of a case.'" Bias is a "hanging"
offense. These prohibitions against deciding cases in which
judges have either a personal or a financial interest are strong
and unyielding, and for good reason. Where the law is just and
wise, bias could lead judges to disregard it in favor of some more
partisan interest. Where the law is unjust or unwise, bias and
favoritism do nothing to correct its intrinsic weakness, but only
add a second layer of mischief to compound the first. The isola-
tion of judges from these types of influences is strictly necessary
for them to preserve their ability to perform their institutional
function. Ex ante, probably no one gains from a biased or cor-
rupt judiciary.
The only question is how this basic principle is enforced.
Corrupt behavior, once detected, is subject to massive penalties.
11. CODE OF JUDIcIL CoNDucT Canon 3, § B(11) (1990).
12. Id. at Canon 3, § B(9).
13. See generally id. at Canon 4.
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To forestall the need to apply these heavy sanctions, the legal
system generates a wide range of prophylactic rules that allow
judges to escape even the suspicion of bias.14 They can recuse
themselves from cases;15 they can avoid socializing with lawyers
who have, or are likely to have, cases before them; 6 and they
can sharply limit their other activities. It is obvious that judges
cannot practice law,'7 work for business corporations, 8 or lobby
Congress.' Accordingly, their outside activities are largely lim-
ited to writing books, giving speeches, and teaching,20 and these
have now been subject to extensive limitation by Congress.2'
The academic cast to judges' work is no accident, for academics
also function in a world in which there is some, albeit less, pre-
mium on detachment and independence. Like Caesar's wife and
baseball umpires, judges must be above suspicion.
In addition, federal (and some state) judges are insulated
from the more obvious demands of the political process-at least
if they survive, as Robert Bork did not, the initial confirmation
process. They serve with tenure for life on good behavior.22
Their salary cannot be reduced during their term of office,23 and
it would provoke a major constitutional crisis for Congress to use
its budget power to deprive them of the staff and support
needed to discharge their ordinary duties. All this is not to say
that judges are wholly immune from congressional scrutiny.
There is always some discretion in the appropriations process, as
much for the judicial branch as for any other, and at the margin,
it may well incline judges to act more as the current Congress
would like. 4 The refusal to grant an overall pay raise, which is
within the ordinary congressional prerogative, might influence
how judges act and behave, especially in periods of inflation.25
It is easy, however, to overstate the effectiveness of these
14. See generally CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
15. Id. at Canon 3, § E(1).
16. Id. at Canon 4, § A.
17. Id. at Canon 4, § G.
18. Id. at Canon 4, § D(3).
19. Id. at Canon 4, § C(1).
20. Id. at Canon 4, § B.
21. Ethics and Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 601, 103 Stat. 1760-61 (to
be codified at 5 U.S.C. App. § 501-05).
22. US. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
23. Id.
24. See the evidence on this point collected in Toma, supra note 10, at 130-32.
25. Indexing judiciary salaries to inflation may be a viable strategy, at least if the
starting point were correctly determined.
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financial sanctions at Congress' disposal. While pay raise limita-
tions may be directed at the judiciary, they must be used across
the board.26 Thus it is not possible to deny increases to judges
who have voted one way on a critical abortion or civil rights
case, while granting increases to sympathetic judges who voted
the other way. Fortunately, because the control over salaries is
subject to a nondiscrimination constraint, the congressional
power over the purse is reduced to a blunt and imperfect instru-
ment that must be visited on friend and foe alike.28 For example,
the senator or representative who wants to get even with" Justice
Scalia must impose identical penalties on Justice Marshall. (It
is, however, easier for Congress to "get" the Supreme Court than
the lower courts because there is only one court with far fewer
members than the Circuit Courts.) The political sanctions im-
posed upon judges are therefore far less than the selective and
pointed sanctions routinely imposed upon other political ac-
tors-who have the constant risk of the next election, and the
constant pressure from constituents and special interest groups
to hew to one line or another. Ex parte contacts are out of
bounds in the judicial context; they are mother's milk for the
legislators and administrators.
This brief survey of the institutional constraints on judges
offers a good explanation of why hard-nosed public choice analy-
sis loses its force and allure when applied to the judiciary's ordi-
nary business in deciding cases. The set of institutional struc-
tures that has been introduced at the federal level has done its
job.29 The structure of the federal courts is surely not a function
of happenstance. As with our other constitutional choices, it is a
function of reflection and choice, not one of accident and force.30
26. See generally Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 248-54 (1920).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Many of these constraints also work at the state level, but there, judges are in
some cases subject to reelection, even if they serve for lengthy terms. See, e.g., CAL.
CoNST. art. VI, § 26; ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 12. The patterns of selection in New York are a
crazy quilt of different rules for Civil Court, Criminal Court, Housing Court, Supreme
Court (e.g., trial court) and Appellate Court. New York City has even run ads to get
lawyers to apply for positions as judges. See Frank, Help Wanted: Ads Attract Potential
Judges, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1986, at 18.
Recall petitions, as with former Chief Justice Rose Bird in California, can also en-
gender some political element into the entire system. See generally Chiang, State Bar to
Talk Power This Weekend, San Francisco Chron., Aug. 24, 1990, at 5, col. 1; Sappell,
Death Penalty Controversy Trails Bird, L.A. Times, May 14, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
30. As Alexander Hamilton stated:
8271
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The risks of a judiciary dependent upon the legislature or the
President were well foreseen by the framers of the Constitution,
who were aware of the situation in England. In their constitu-
tional moment, the framers chose a set of safeguards that have
worked well to minimize the impact of such risks. The usual
public choice analysis presupposes that what drives politicians is
the desire for reelection to office, election to higher office, or in-
fluence and power within office, as with critical committee as-
signments and the like. 3' Political actors are, therefore, in some
sense only an inch away from the pressures of the ordinary polit-
ical process, where they can be challenged either by an opposing
party or by .primaries within the parties. By conscious design,
federal judges are insulated from these electoral sanctions and
therefore have far greater ability to ignore short-term public
opinion except in the most pressing and important cases.2 In
addition, their compensation cannot be diminished during their
term of office, 33 nor are judges allowed to sell their services to
the highest bidder. They cannot initiate law suits in order to
extract promises from political actors, nor can they contract to
sell their services in any other market. While they might violate
these prohibitions, the probability of being caught is not insub-
stantial, and the legal and social sanctions for being caught are
inexorable and severe. Judges are cut off from the usual sources
of market and political gain. Their behavior should reflect their
relative isolation, even under the self-interest hypothesis.
With the dominant sources of gain, loss, and influence
closed to them, there is less material on which the logic of self-
interest can work. The self-interest payoff structure for being a
judge probably exerts a modest selection effect on who chooses
to take the role. Knowledge of the isolated conditions of the job
It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the
people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important
question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever des-
tined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force.
THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 3 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
31. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 8, at 875-83.
32. Those state court judges who do face electoral tests may well act more like the
public, choice model predicts, although most states structure their election laws for
judges in ways that moderate the political pressures. The terms may be long, or the
judges may run for office outside the ordinary two party structure.
33. U.S. CONST. art Il, § 1. "Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute
more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support." THE
FEDERALIST No. 79, at 531 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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and the relatively low financial compensation structures tends to
induce persons of judicial "temperament" to seek and obtain ju-
dicial appointments.34 But owing to the enormous political im-
portance of the job in the current legal climate, the pay-off
structure may well be dominated by other more powerful pas-
sions, as the battle over the Bork nomination so clearly
illustrated.
More important are the effects of this system of sanctions
on how judges handle and decide cases. The elaborate prohibi-
tions make it difficult, if not impossible, to yield to the normal
kinds of financial and electoral pressures other public officials
experience because the usual highways of exploitation are effec-
tively controlled. As a result, the theory of self-interest predicts
that judges will then seek to maximize their self-interest by
travelling along unregulated byways. In this context, there is an
instructive parallel to the ordinary theory of rate regulation,
which asks how members of a firm behave when the firm faces
sharp restrictions on the rates of monetary return it can realize
from its activities.3 5 With the pecuniary avenues for gain closed,
firm managers turn to nonpecuniary gains-first class tickets,
large offices, extensive lunch breaks and the like to maximize
their profits. The impulse toward self-interest is thus diverted
into areas of activity that fall outside the scope of regulation.
Within the scope of the firm, these responses to regulation
are generally regarded as unfortunate. If the firm spends $1000
in revenue to provide its managers perks that managers value at
only $500, then everyone is better off if the managers are al-
lowed to accept from the corporation a simple transfer of $750 in
cash. Within the context of the theory of regulation, there are
good reasons to impose restraints on the ability of judges to go
to the market to increase their financial remuneration. But once
the focus turns from justification to prediction, it seems clear
that judges will respond to restrictions on their freedom much
like managers of the regulated firm. If judges cannot command
money for their labor, and if they need not worry about reelec-
tion, then what is left? One possibility is that judges will maxi-
mize leisure by slacking off on the time and energy that they put
into their judicial decisions. If their salary is constant regardless
34. See generally Greenburg & Haley, The Rule of Compensation Structure in En-
hancing Judicial Quality, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (1986).
35. See generally R. POSNEK ECONomic ANALYSIS Op LAW 321-33 (1986).
827]
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of their performance, then why not take it easy? To be sure,
there are limits on this strategy, for judges who fall too far be-
hind in their work may be subject to serious sanctions, such as
being barred from sitting on new cases. But judicial indepen-
dence is surely consistent with some reduction in output by
judges who have lost the taste and enthusiasm for their job.
The presence of sharp financial and political controls could
lead to other responses: ambitious judges could seek to maximize
their "influence" and "prestige," which are normally achieved by
excellence in argument and writing. Other judges and lawyers
are more likely to be impressed by judges who have a strong
command of their subject matter, who make the strongest possi-
ble arguments for their position, and who avoid relying on raw
and untested clerks to splice together quotations from earlier
cases and law review articles. It matters to judges that their
opinions are cited and followed by others who are free to ignore
them. It matters to judges that their opinions are included in
casebooks and discussed in popular journals and law reviews.
How could it be otherwise? Self-interest, therefore, pays power-
ful dividends to judges who excel in these traditional areas, just
as the public choice theory should predict, given the constraints
on the system.
In addition, the lack of short-term financial incentives nec-
essarily increases the relative importance of a judge's world view.
If judges are immune from the pressures of reelection, they are
likely to try to satisfy themselves or their close friends. It follows
that we should expect to see the decisions of judges heavily in-
fluenced by the intellectual orientation and political inclinations
that they brought with them to the bench in the first place.36
Judges With a strong commercial practice may be expected to
work heavily in that area. Those who are drawn from public ar-
eas may have a special understanding of the strengths and weak-
nesses of their offices. Clerks too may have a strong influence in
the way in which they "socialize" judges by passing on the latest
in academic fad or fancy. These influences may well get weaker
over time.
36. The point was recognized early on. See, for example, the comments of William
Smith of South Carolina, noting with 'respect to federal judges: "Should the district
judge be under any bias, it is reasonable to suppose it would be rather in favor of his
fellow-citizens than in favor of foreigners, or the United States." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 799
(J. Gales ed. 1789), quoted in G. Casper, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Indepen-
dence of Judges 12 (unpublished manuscript).
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Nonetheless, there is a range of factors that we should look
to in order to predict the judicial decisions of judges, even from
the public choice perspective. Thus, one oft-cited study by Pro-
fessor Tate finds that "parsimonious attribute models" of the
voting behavior of Supreme Court judges explain between sev-
enty and ninety percent of the "liberal" and "conservative" vari-
ance by an appeal to such variables as party identification, ap-
pointing president, region of .birth, and prior judicial and
prosecutorial experience.3 7 Note, however, that this model, while
predictive, makes no reference at all to how judges maximize
anything. Rather than looking forward to see how judges obtain
power, promotion, influence, wealth, or prestige, the model finds
those certain key historical facts which are likely to shape the
values that judges bring to their decisions. But we should not
expect otherwise. It is the absence of any powerful financial or
political inducements which allows these second order factors to
dominate.
When all is said and done, however, these determinants
seem to be fairly weak, for they lack certain focus and definition;
judges do what they think to be right or expedient without hav-
ing to pay an obvious political or electoral price. The theory of
self-interest predicts, however, that as the external constraints
are weaker, judges maximize their own welfare by looking to
these other intangibles. But stated in this fashion, public choice
theory loses its allure and driving force. It becomes description,
and rather bland description at that, without expose.
In dealing with political actors, the intellectual thrust of
public choice theory exposes the divergence between the private
and the social interest manifested by politicians when they sell
out to "special" interest groups or engage in logrolling of one
form or another. The "news" in public choice theory is tied to
the notable failures of the political system, whether in legislation
37. Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 Am. PoL.
ScL. REv. 355-66 (1981). Under Tate's model, liberals and conservatives were evaluated in
two separate domains: civil liberties and economic matters. In the first, liberals were
regarded as more likely to protect civil liberties than conservatives. In the second, liber-
als were more likely than conservatives to favor government intervention into markets
and the protection of employees as against their employers. Tate's model predicted that
Democrats appointed by Democratic presidents with prior judicial, but not prior
prosecutorial, experience from outside the South were far more apt to be liberal than
conservative. The data base ends with the 1978 term, and it is not clear whether his
conclusions would hold for the more fractured Supreme Court decisions of the 1980s. Id.
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or regulation. Its social and reform agenda is to construct a sys-
tem of constitutional, procedural, or voting rules that stem the
abuses so closely associated with the problems of faction and
self-aggrandizement. The repeated failures of electoral reform,
ethics, and conflict of interest legislation and the like indicate
just how intractable the problem is. Legal restrictions on official
action may be too restrictive as well as too lax, which can easily
be the case with conflict of interest rules applicable to executive
officials, both before taking office and after leaving it.3" But,
with judges as deciders of cases there are no major divergences
between public and private interest that can be found, and no
genuine structural reforms can be devised which might improve
the overall situation. The self-interest theory predicts that given
this set of institutional constraints judges will behave more or
less as the public interest demands-relatively immune from the
short-term improprieties that could bring down the system as a
whole.
2. Cyclical voting
The same basic analysis applies to Judge Easterbrook's ef-
fort to apply yet another element of public choice analysis to
judicial behavior.3  Easterbrook demonstrates at elaborate
length that the familiar problems of cycling-those that occur
when three voters are faced with three or more alternatives-can
often arise within the judicial context.40 Given that the Supreme
Court conveniently has nine members, it is easy to construct cy-
cles in which three judges take each of three positions. The exis-
tence of cycles influences the way judges write their opinions. As
Easterbrook notes, it is important for each group of judges to
write separately in order to preserve its options for the next
round of cases. 41 As that process repeats over time, a certain
38. For a pointed discussion of the obstacles that are hurled in the path of public
service, see Norton, Who Wants to Work in Washington?, FORTUNE, Aug. 14, 1989, at 77.
One instance that captures the expess: Donald Atwood, age 65, a key General Motors
executive, took a Defense Department job. In addition to being required to sell all his
stocks in taxable transactions, he was required to take out an insurance policy at his own
expense that guaranteed his pension, his life insurance, and his health benefits against
the insolvency of General Motors, lest he direct business in that direction to prop up the
firm in order to secure his own pension. Id. Why bother?, which is one conclusion of
Norton's article.
39. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982).
40. Id. at 814-31.
41. Id. at 809-11.
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level of doctrinal inconsistency will necessarily crop up even if
each individual judge (or group of judges) takes consistent doc-
trinal positions across the board-although this often is not the
case.42 The problem of cyclical voting, therefore, can indepen-
dently undermine the output of judges just as it undermines the
output of any political body.
Easterbrook has engaged in a form of public choice analysis
by showing that the ordinary rules of voting behavior apply to
courts. But, public choice theory is concerned with more than
voting cycles. It also posits that individual actors vote to maxi-
mize their self-interest. With or without cycles, therefore, it is
necessary to find out how judges reach their own complex, sub-
stantive positions that lead to cycles in the first instance. What
position do they take on child pornography, abortion, state aid
to religious education, environmental protection and other is-
sues? There is at this level simply no external pressure that
drives the judges to select their positions that is remotely com-
parable to the powerful political forces legislatures are exposed
to, forces, for example, like those surrounding school busing.
Judges vote only for themselves and not as representatives
of anyone. The voting behavior in judicial and legislative bodies
may suffer from some of the same problems of collective choice.
But it does not follow that the preference functions of judges are
formed in the same way as those of legislators, given their radi-
cally disjointed incentive structures. When commentators say
that courts act like superlegislators, it is because they disap-
prove of the level of judicial intervention. They attack the sub-
ject matter or the substance of the decision as inappropriate.
They do not assume that the same political forces work on
judges as on legislators. Quite the opposite, the claim is that
judges, as unelected officials, should not assume the same role as
legislators precisely because they are all too free of the political
restraints that bind elected and appointed officials.
B. Judges as Market Actors
The situation changes once our attention is turned to judges
as market actors in their secondary, non-courtroom activities.
One example is sufficient to illustrate the more general point.
Judges need to hire clerks, and they do so in a competitive em-
ployment market that has many judges on one side of the mar-
42. Id. at 831.
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ket and many third year students or recent law school graduates
on the other. Hiring clerks is not governed by any strong norms
of the sort that involve judicial decisionmaking, and the conse-
quences are evident to all of us who have both participated in
and observed the clerkship market. The best way to explain how
the market works is to assume that judges behave like any other
employers. They seek to obtain the best clerks for themselves
and have proven markedly resistant to various external efforts to
regulate the market.
The basic story, much simplified, goes like this.43 For many
years the date of clerk selection, particularly by the elite judges,
moved earlier and earlier. Judges (at least federal circuit and
district court judges) surveying clerk prospects are often confi-
dent about hiring decisions the moment that the editorial boards
for the law reviews are chosen in the spring of the second year.
There is little variation in grades from the first to the third year,
so the chance of a major mistake is relatively small. For judges
seeking the best clerks, law review selection of authors is the last
piece of really important information they require. Few judges
think that further delay in selection will yield more valuable in-
formation, and each fears that further delay will allow other
judges, armed with this information, to cream off the best of the
clerkship market.
It should be apparent that a collective action problem in-
fects clerkship selection. If all judges waited (say until beginning
of the third year) to select their clerks, then perhaps all could
make marginally better decisions. The stage was therefore set
for a joint response to control this prisoner's dilemma game. Af-
ter much skillful negotiation, the major law schools were able to
persuade the Federal Judicial Conference (an umbrella organiza-
tion for federal judges) to adopt a rule prohibiting federal judges
from accepting applications from, or letters of recommendation
about, prospective clerks until September 15, 1984, or from hir-
ing before that date.44 Could this cartel-like arrangement (I do
not pass judgment as to whether the cartel is either good or bad)
prove stable over time? Standard economic theory predicts that
it would not. Individual judges and individual applicants had
strong incentives to jump the gun in order to secure the best
43. Some information about the story can be found in Levin, Notes from the Execu-
tive Director, Law Schools Newsletter, April 1990, at 6. Much of the rest of what is
contained here comes from recollection of the chain of events of myself and others.
44. Id. at 6.
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possible match. And that is exactly what happened, in stages.
Initially some judges suffered major inconvenience because they
were not at work at the time of the original deadline but were on
vacation or business trips, often overseas. Forced to the choose
between selecting too early or too late, they placed enormous
pressures on faculty and students alike for early decisions made
"for cause," lest they lose out altogether. Other judges, who were
willing to abide by the deadlines so long as everyone else fol-
lowed them, became alarmed and also began to make inquiries
before the deadline, as did enterprising students whose friends
from the recent graduating class got wind of what was happen-
ing. The cartel began to unravel.
Worse still, the designers of the September 15th deadline
did not appreciate the difficulties of their newly created match-
ing program. Matching programs have been widely and success-
fully used to place recent graduates of medical schools into resi-
dency programs.45 Medical school graduates and teaching
hospitals list their choices in rank order, and a computer spits
out the job assignments for all graduates on a single day, with
both graduate and institution bound to accept the match. But
the simple time deadline in the law school setting did not work
in that fashion. Matches could not be made simultaneously
when the restraint was lifted. In consequence, as soon as appli-
cations became "legal," there was (as economic theory would
predict) a mad scramble. Judges summoned students to inter-
views so that they could make their hiring decisions. Many stu-
dents were asked to go to both coasts on the same day. I heard
stories of students who received telephone offers from Judge X
in one circuit, while interviewing with Judge Y in chambers
somewhere else. The system quickly broke down.
In 1985 the understanding was that July 15th was the dead-
line, but that deadline quickly eroded. Within two years, the
older practice of early applications and decisions by some judges
resumed. This past year, 1990, some effort was made to institute
a rule whereby applications were not to be accepted before
March 1, 1990, and hiring offers were not to be made until May
1, 1990.46 Here too, there were notable defections from the sys-
45. See Roth, Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A
Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J. POL. ECON. 991 (1984).
46. Originally, letters of recommendation were not supposed to be submitted before
April 1, 1990, but the date was moved back to March 1, 1990 to facilitate letter writing
and interviewing during spring break. The May 1, 1990 decision date has held. See Let-
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tern: the Fifth Circuit judges, for example, refused; the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits did not take a position; some judges on the
Ninth Circuit have refused to accept the limitation; and there
were occasional stories of some offers being made in violation of
the May 1, 1990 norm.47 By the close of the 1990 hiring season,
the partial system of hiring restraints had buckled, but had not
cracked. When the 1991 hiring season opened this January,
there were no signs of any of the prior restraints that had been
operative in 1990. The word was quickly passed that all restric-
tions were off. Judges asked for applications and letters of rec-
ommendation when the pleased, and it seems clear as of this
writing (February 1991) that the judges who are so inclined will
make their initial hiring decisions as soon as they receive infor-
mation about the law review selections. The cartel is no more,
and there is no talk that it will be revised in future years. Freed
of the restraints of office, the judges have acted like other eco-
nomic actors, so that economic theory has triumphed again. 8
The point of the above example can be generalized. When-
ever judges appear at conferences, serve on committees, teach in
law schools, or sit on boards, they act pretty much the way the
rest of us do, because they no longer labor under the distinctive
set of incentives that apply to their case work. And that is the
way it should be. Judicial output is the key role of judges, not
hiring clerks or delivering speeches.
IV. VIRTUE
A. Are Independent Judges Agents of Social Good?
At the level of intrigue and misbehavior, then, the public
choice analysis yields the happy conclusion that the system
works as well as -we might hope. When it comes to deciding
cases,, the independence of judges is hemmed in by a powerful
set of constraints that cut off the obvious forms of misbehavior
and abuse. Nonetheless, the success in coping with these obvious
ter from Betsy Levin to Deans of Member Law Schools and Members of the House of
Representatives (Jan. 23, 1990) (Memorandum 90-5).
47. Id.
48. It is worth noting that these problems have never emerged at the Supreme
Court level. There are only nine Justices, and they can more easily coordinate their
plans, and in any event each has his or her own set of special connections for finding
clerks. Some like to choose early; others like to wait. But there will probably not be a
system of direct regulation of Supreme Court clerkships as had been tried the circuit and
district court judges.
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problems ushers in a second tier of analysis, one that is con-
cerned with effects of judicial independence that are more diffi-
cult to sort out. Apart from intrigue and bias, what institutional
strengths and weaknesses are introduced by the conscious politi-
cal decision to insulate the judicial function from the daily pres-
sures of interest group politics? On this score, the independence
of the judiciary is very much a two-edged sword. With the obvi-
ous political pressures off, judges will tend to respond to more
subtle and diffuse pressures. They may even find it in their in-
terest to do solely what they think is "right" from a legal and
moral point of view-at once an appealing and terrifying pros-
pect. Yet their desires and their rectitude are not the tests of
their effectiveness. Effectiveness depends on an assessment of
their work and the soundness of the decisions they reach relative
to some normative social benchmark. Any overall assessment
therefore depends on a decidedly political judgment of the right
and wrong of judicial conduct. One has to know what is the right
behavior for judges to ask whether they have fulfilled their
expectation.
Consider, for example, the decisions of the old, pre-1937
Court to uphold property and contract rights against various
forms of legislative control. For those who thought (and think)
that the New Deal legislation was necessary to correct some
powerful market and structural failures, the independence of the
judges was an obstacle to be overcome and not a virtue to be
applauded. President Roosevelt was prepared to pack the Su-
preme Court to obtain his way, notwithstanding the unsettling
implications for long-term practice. Yet, if one thinks (as I
think) that markets should be protected against legislatures,
then in this context at least, the independence of the judiciary
was (before it faltered) a welcome virtue on those same issues.
Yet, sometimes the shoe is surely on the other political foot.
Those who (like myself) are uneasy about the constant expan-
sion of race and sex conscious legal norms are likewise uneasy
about a judicial system that adopts or endorses sexual and racial
criteria in advance of explicit legislative authorization and per-
haps even after such authorization.4" Yet, others who think that
matters of race aid sex rise to the top of the political agenda
will applaud judicial intervention even in the teeth of deter-
49. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (modifying
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
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mined legislative resistance. Nor are these matters immune from
changes in fad or fashion. Calls of judicial restraint were on the
conservative wing until the last round of 1988 Supreme Court
decisions when suddenly appeals to legislative intent and stare
decisis became liberal watchwords. 50 Taken issue by issue then,
no astute political actor should have either intrinsic affection or
distrust for judicial independence. Rather, political types of all
persuasions use a different measure. First they know their goals;
only then do they support that constellation of attitudes toward
judicial behavior that advances those goals. So far the analysis
follows the self-interested line that public choice -theory might
predict.
Yet, what if one rises above the fray and asks whether, be-
hind a veil of ignorance, we should support or oppose judicial
independence. At one level that choice is easy because only a
fair measure of judicial independence makes it possible to avoid
the ugliest forms of legislative domination and judicial misbe-
havior. An independent judiciary may be bad, but a dependent
one is worse. But the choice is more problematic if we restate
the inquiry on the somewhat fanciful assumption that bias and
corruption already have been controlled- by narrow, well-tailored
criminal sanctions. At the ultimate level, the only constant
across all substantive issues is the number of hurdles that must
be crossed before the state can impose its commands on individ-
ual citizens. When an independent judiciary exercises its own
powers of statutory construction and constitutional interpreta-
tion, it interposes one more obstacle between collective will and
the force of law. Therefore, those people who entertain a global
skepticism about government power should applaud judicial in-
dependence as a general principle even if they deplore its out-
come in particular cases. Conversely, those people who are more
supportive of expansive government action should be skeptical
of judicial independence. Perceived defects in private ordering
call for far more government than the advocates of laissez-faire
would tolerate. A caring government cannot work quickly and
efficiently if beset by divided powers and a complex system of
checks and balances.
More complex permutations are also possible. Modern con-
50. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2115; City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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stitutional law revolves around two critical distinctions. 51 The
first of these is between preferred freedoms (e.g., speech and as-
sociation, and perhaps religion) and ordinary economic rights.
The second is between suspect classifications (race and perhaps
sex) and classifications between ordinary economic activities. It
is no accident that the higher level of scrutiny attached to pre-
ferred freedoms and suspect classifications rests on the powerful
judicial distrust of legislative institutions. The clear sense of leg-
islative failure invites the system of "multiple vetoes" implicit in
the institution of judicial review. Yet where the courts believe
that the legislature does its job, then the far lower standard of
rational basis review is invoked.52 Judicial activism, like judicial
independence, is prized only where the confidence in political in-
stitutions is at its low ebb.
Judicial independence, and judicial activism, become most
problematic when they are used to subvert, and not support, a
system of multiple vetoes. That problem arises most acutely
when the judicial power is used, not to strike down legislation,
but to impose affirmative duties to tax and to spend for particu-
lar services, be they to run school systems, mental hospitals,
prisons or public housing projects.53 By undertaking these func-
tions, courts act as legislators, executive, and judiciary all rolled
into one. The use of judicial power in this context is designed to
subvert, not reinforce, the principle of separation of powers by
allowing courts to circumvent the usual obstacles that lie in the
path of creating new laws. It is for this reason, I suspect, that
the most heated denunciations of judicial activism arise when
the courts initiate activities and order moneys spent in ways
that render the executive and legislative branches superfluous.54
51. The genesis of these distinctions is United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938).
52. See generally Williams v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
53. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (5-4 decision).
54. See, e.g., L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON
RACE AND THE SCHOOLS 13 (1976). Regarding the Supreme Court's busing decisions, Pro-
fessor Graglia states:
Busing could not have become a serious issue, much less actually occur, in al-
most any community in America through the processes of accountable repre-
sentative government. It has become an issue and does occur only because it
has been imposed by the United States Supreme Court-our least accountable
and least representative institution of government-in the name of constitu-
tional law.
Id.
It hardly needs saying that Professor Graglia regards the use of extensive busing as a
827]
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But even this apparent exception reinforces the basic rule: the
case for judicial independence is at its lowest ebb when courts
abandon their checking function and assume more robust pow-
ers of initiation.
B. Judges as Agents of Interest-Group Politics
The view of judicial independence taken here is at sharp va-
riance with that once offered by my colleagues, Professor Landes
and Judge (then Professor) Posner. 5' As their original position
has received a fair bit of attention, it is useful to examine it in
some detail, even though there is some evidence that Posner
himself has either abandoned or modified his position. 6 Landes
and Posner start from a public-choice-like assumption that in-
terest group politics is the only game in town.57 Their universe
appears to include no statutes enacted for the public good.58 In
their view statutes represent political deals between various in-
terest groups whose value, in part, depends upon two key vari-
ables: the durability of the legislative arrangement and the
probability that it will be interpreted and enforced in accor-
dance with its original terms. 9 Thus, if dairy farmers obtain a
generous subsidy in exchange for their support for remedial
reading programs for inner city students, the gains from trade
will be both a function of the number of years that the deal con-
tinues in place and of the initial willingness of the participants
to commit resources to obtain that deal.
At this point, the analysis closely follows that often made of
long-term private commercial contracts.6 Ordinary business
parties will be reluctant to commit to these long-term relation-
ships if they cannot trust any arbitrator or judge to provide an
honest resolution of their disputes. Similarly, in the political
context, if judges are known to misconstrue statutes, (i.e., at va-
riance with their jointly intended meaning) then political actors
will be more reluctant to enter into similar transactions in the
self-defeating disaster.
55. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1.
56. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
57. A point noted by James Buchanan in his comment on Landes and Posner inme-
diately following their article. Buchanan, Comment, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 903 (1975).
58. Id.
59. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 880-85.
60. See generally Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CA-
Li?. L. REv. 2005 (1987).
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future. Bad judicial construction reduces its joint overall value
at formation. Straightforward interpretation in accordance with
original intention therefore greases the wheels of politics, and
that type of interpretation can only come from independent
judges who have no special affiliation with either party to the
transaction. Landes and Posner write: "If we assume that an in-
dependent judiciary would, in contrast [to a judiciary acting as
an agent of the present legislature], interpret and apply legisla-
tion in accordance with the original legislative understand-
ing. . . [,] it follows that an independent judiciary facilitates
rather than, as is conventionally believed, limits the practice of
interest-group politics."'" Thereafter, they argue that their as-
sumption indeed holds, both because there are very few political
efforts to reign in judicial conduct and because impartial and
neutral judges aid the legislative process by making its outcomes
more predictable.6 2 To be sure, they acknowledge that indepen-
dent judges cannot eliminate all risks to legislative deals, for in a
world of pure interest-group politics, what one legislature puts
into place another can always rip asunder.63 But by controlling
one source of risk, judges do increase the private gains from par-
tisan and cooperative political action. Judges, in a word, have to
take the high ground in order for interest-group politics to func-
tion business as usual. To be the enforcers of deals generated by
the political system, judges must lie outside of it.
This account of the independent judiciary is flawed, I be-
lieve, in several key respects. While Landes and Posner are
somewhat reticent as to the desirability of interest-group deals,
in principle we can condemn these deals with a good deal of fer-
vor because the gains to the participants of these deals are more
than offset by the losses that are inflicted upon losing parties.
Therefore, it would be grotesque to justify the independence of
judges as a way to keep these suspect deals afloat. Far better it
is to justify judicial independence on the grounds that the
judges would strike down such deals (at least in greater propor-
tion than they do sound public legislation).
To be sure, interest group deals are grist for today's legisla-
tive mill at the federal, state, and city levels. But that ought not
to be the case. The founders of our Federal Constitution, at
61. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 879.
62. Id. at 885.
63. Id. at 877.
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HeinOnline  -- 1990 BYU L. Rev. 849 1990
850 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1990
least, were well aware of the power of faction and its ability to
generate special interest deals. But surely they did not celebrate
this practice just because they recognized its persistence . 4
Rather, their concern with faction shows that they understood
that the give-and-take of redistributive legislation always yields
a negative sum game, so that special interest deals had to be
curtailed to improve the functioning of the social system. 5 To-
ward that end they introduced an elaborate set of jurisdictional
limitations and substantive protections designed to reduce the
opportunities for these deals. Any judge, therefore, who is con-
cerned with fulfilling her constitutional office must do more than
enforce the deals as they are made. She must also decide that
these deals, fairly construed, pass constitutional muster. Any in-
dependent judge, once appointed, has to be prepared to strike
down legislation propounded by the very political groups that
propelled her into high office, as is evident in the recent furor
over the flag burning cases.6
This pivotal constitutional role generates a very different
explanation for the neutrality and independence of judges. Far
from propping up interest-group deals, independence allows
judges to strike them down without fear of immediate and per-
sonal retribution." Independence also plays an important role
when no question of statutory construction or validity is before
64. On two types of pluralism, see Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight
from Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633 (1988).
65. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 59 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). James
Madison noted:
But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and
unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without
property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are credi-
tors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed in-
terest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, with
many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them
into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.
Id.
Madison then notes that while "[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,"
the same constraint does not apply to legislatures, and he wonders how self-interest can
be constrained without, however, discussing judicial review. Id.
66. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989).
67. "A man may then be sure of the ground upon which he stands, and can never be
deterred from his duty by the apprehension of being placed in a less eligible situation."
THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 532 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). As ever, Hamilton
overstates his case, given that he has previously recognized in the same essay that "fluc-
tuations in the value of money" can erode the effective rate of compensation, but he does
not give voice to these difficulties. Id. at 531.
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the court, for it allows judges to make findings of fact on liabil-
ity, or on guilt or innocence, even against high government offi-
cials, without fear of political retribution. The judge who scut-
tles some elaborate political compromise or resists powerful
popular demands is insulated by the system from the wrath of
the legislature in the full range of judicial activities. There is no
removal from office save by impeachment and conviction for
"high Crimes and Misdemeanours,"68 and there is no reduction
of salary that can take place during the term of office.6 9
Landes and Posner, on the contrary, assume that indepen-
dence guarantees that judges will decide cases in accordance
with the norm of "original tenor" or "original meaning" 7 0-a
view which reduces the cost of drafting interest-group (or any
other type of) legislation. But independence from external con-
straint does not commit judges to any canon of statutory con-
struction or to any particular approach to legislation. Quite the
contrary, it frees them to develop whatever theories of statutory
construction and constitutional interpretation, wise or foolish,
deferential or mischievous, that captures their fancy.7 1 Often
judges use that power in ways that do not seem to increase the
durability of interest-group legislation. The Supreme Court to-
day is remarkably tolerant of legislation that strips individuals
of vested economic rights created under prior legislation.72
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanours." "Civil officers" includes
judges.
69. Article I states:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Ser-
vices a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. m, § 1.
70. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 885.
71. Judge Posner seems to acknowledge this point in his book on the Federal
Courts. "It is a ziiyth that independence guarantees a nonpolitical judiciary. Its tendency,
rather, is to make the court system an autonomous center of political power. Indepen-
dence means that once the judge is appointed he cannot be compelled or even induced to
do the bidding of the appointing authority." R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS
AND REFORM 16 (1985). But he does not comment on the apparent inconsistency with his
earlier paper with Landes. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 885.
72. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). Connolly held that Congress was allowed
to renege on its original promise to allow companies that had joined the Pension Guar-
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Again, some of the most independent judges can (and over
the years have strained to) import constructions on statutes that
bear little or no connection to the original statutory design, even
if their decisions have been much more in tune with the temper
of the contemporary Congress than with the one which first en-
acted the laws. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (espe-
cially Title VII on employment) meant one thing to the 1964
Congress that drafted, debated, and passed it, but quite another
thing now that the Supreme Court has construed its central pro-
visions, as they relate to sex-based annuity tables, 73 affirmative
action,'7 4 the use of bona fide employment testing, 5 or bona fide
occupational qualifications.7 6 In each case, the more cautious,
color-blind language of the original 1964 statute was overridden
in favor of an aggressive statutory interpretation that confers
additional rights to certain "protected groups," women and mi-
norities, who enjoyed no special status under the original
statute.
One can either hail or oppose these developments, but that
is beside the point in any debate on judicial independence. Their
own freedom makes judges inappropriate guardians of interest-
group deals or indeed of any statutory compromise. As with the
civil rights statutes, the Court was far more in tune with the
congressional moods of the 1970s than with those of the 1960s.
Independence and neutrality do not guarantee, or even promote
the likelihood, that judges will use ordinary and honest interpre-
tative methods in dealing with matters of statutory construction.
Judges are not commercial arbitrators hired on a case-by-case
basis. They do not have to return to the market in order to
anty Corporation to withdraw without financial penalty. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 211.
After many companies joined in reliance on this promise, the government changed the
rules of the game and retroactively imposed penalties upon withdrawal. Id. at 211. The
Court therefore allowed a subsequent legislature to upset the elaborate deal imposed by
the earlier legislature.
The net effect was to reduce the effectiveness of legislative deals. It is hard to square
this relaxed attitude with an assumption that the Court wants to facilitate the ability of
interest groups to fashion long-term accommodations. Rather, the present judicial posi-
tion reduces the expected durability of any legislative compromise. The decisions in Con-
nolly and Turner-Elkhorn also make it more difficult for private firms to do business
with the government, and thus raise the cost for future transactions on both sides, which
in turn creates an unambiguous social loss.
73. E.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978).
74. E.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
75. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
76. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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maintain their book of business. They have the luxury of behav-
ing like monopolists with an assured supply of new cases. Their
own independence allows those who are so inclined to indulge in
every temptation to renege on the arrangements that gave them
power. Independence also allows judges to remain, in large mea-
sure, outside the sphere of legislative control. Independence
therefore encourages judges to become the proverbial "loose can-
non" on the decks of the law. If judges were part of the network
of special-interest contracting, then Congress or state legisla-
tures would have some way to keep them in line. But as the sys-
tem is presently constructed, judicial independence negates
accountability.
C. Can Independent Judges Be Constrained?
The independence of judges is a mixed blessing, both from a
social and an interest-group perspective. This ambivalence,
moreover, was evident from the earliest days. 7 At the same time
that article III of the Constitution gave judges their independent
position, and (it seems likely) their power of judicial review,
Congress itself was uneasy about allowing judges to remain
wholly immune from external influences. The 1789 Judiciary Act
therefore is notable for its effort to limit the scope of the juris-
diction of the federal courts in ways, however, that did not allow
a meddlesome Congress to exercise case-by-case review of judi-
cial decisions.78 General federal question jurisdiction was not
granted to the lower courts e.7 The right to a jury trial was pre-
served, both in the Judiciary Act and independently in the sev-
enth amendment.8 0 Similarly the power of the courts to award
equitable remedies, which harkened back to the English royal
77. See generally G. Casper, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Independence of
Judges (unpublished manuscript) which contains a superb summary of the relevant
history.
78. Note that this alternative is not quite so far fetched as it seems. The House of
Lords as a judicial body exercises that kind of power, even though its members, at least
at the time of United States Constitution, had substantial legislative powers as well. And
in this country some legislative bodies had judicial functions as well. See Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386 (1798) (an important case of retroactivity and the contracts clause
arose because the upper house of the Connecticut legislature had the power to review the
provisions of an individual will).
79. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (jurisdiction in diversity
and criminal cases only).
80. See id. §§ 9, 12, 13 (providing for jury determinations of issues of fact, save for
admiralty, maritime and equity cases).
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prerogative, was not available in cases "where [a] plain, ade-
quate and complete remedy may be had at law." '
Nor is there anything necessarily churlish on the part of
Congress in proposing some limitations on the scope of judicial
decisions. If one starts with the assumption that all public offi-
cials, whatever their role and function, are subject to whims and
political pressure, then there is no easy solution which says
"trust me, trust my branch of government" in all cases. Any
"corner solution" that vests full discretion in some branch of
government and none in another is likely to be a mistake. Be-
cause splitting power across separate branches is the preferred
strategy, the Constitution probably is unsound in conferring ap-
pointments of judges during good behavior, effectively for life.
In this regard, the constitutional solution departs in sub-
stantial ways from its English and state law precedents which, as
Gerhard Casper has pointed out, used the good behavior stan-
dard only to insure that judges did not serve at will.8 2 It was not
paired with tenure for life. Service during good behavior is a
sensible standard when a judge is appointed for a term of seven
or ten years, as was common at the time of the revolution.8 3
Similarly, service during good behavior carries with it less risk
when the judge is subject to a mandatory retirement age, such as
seventy."4 But the good behavior standard comes at a far higher
price when it is used to protect judges in their eighties whose
intellectual powers and physical endurance have in all likelihood
diminished. I think that a constitutional amendment, especially
for Supreme Court Justices, requiring retirement at a fixed age
(present members excepted), or after a fixed term (say of eigh-
81. Id. § 16.
82. See Casper, supra note 77.
83. Id. Casper notes that in six states-Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland and South Carolina-judges were removable upon
the demand of both houses of the legislature, as was the case for members of the House
of Lords in England. In five states-Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia and Georgia-judges served only for a term of years.
Note that the removal power gives the legislature only an imperfect check over sit-
ting judges. First, it does not allow the legislature to reverse any particular decision and
forces the legislature to remove a judge for a decision on one (or a few) issues, even if the
legislature likes other decisions the judges have made. Second, removal does not give the
legislature any power to select the replacement judge, who may be less to its liking.
84. Some states, e.g., California, have an odd system whereby a judge can continue
to serve after 70, so long as he is willing to take a reduction in retirement benefits. See
CAL. GOV'T CODE, § 75075 (Deering 1982). The statute was upheld against constitutional
challenges in Rittenband v. Cory, 159 Cal. App. 3d 410, 205 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1984).
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teen years) would, on balance, be welcome even if it did limit the
"independence" of the judges.85 Other variations are easily
imagined. As is the case with separation of powers more gener-
ally, it may not make that much of a difference exactly how the
various lines of control are drawn. What does make a difference
is that some lines are drawn somewhere.
V. CONCLUSION
This examination of the independent judiciary bears mixed
fruit. Where there is some awkward compromise and accommo-
dation, there is little to keep the purist in us happy. But the
control of alternative forms of error is a persistent dilemma that
the purist can identify effortlessly but only the well-informed
pragmatist can help to contain. The independence of the judici-
ary contains a core of good sense; judges should not be accounta-
ble directly to the legislature or the executive for their decisions.
Beyond that, however, it is a principle that is subject to a wide
range of qualifications that seek to bring judges within the orbit
of constitutional control. Some constraints, namely those against
obvious forms of abuse and misbehavior, are easily justified. But
even with these in place, the uneasiness that we feel about unac-
countable power carries over to the judicial sphere. But it is a
problem that we endure. For as is so often the case, any radical
cure of judicial excesses is likely to create a set of institutional
difficulties more permanent and more risky than the ones that
are eliminated.
85. This proposal would stagger nominations and remove the quirkiness of having
one president with great power over, appointments while other presidents have none.
Additional rules could be introduced to fill terms left unexpired by death or resignation.
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